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This paper studies the role of money in environments where in each meeting there is
a double coincidence of real wants. Traders who meet at random !nance their purchases
through current production, the sale of divisible money or both. It is shown that in the
absence of valued money if traders have asymmetric tastes for each other’s good, they produce
and exchange socially ine!cient quantities. With valued money, however, traders exchange
e!cient quantities if the asymmetry of tastes is not too large. It is shown that the gains from
trade in the monetary economy are strictly greater than those in the corresponding barter
economy, that the Friedman rule holds, and that the allocation of resources in the monetary
economy converges to the allocation in the barter economy as the growth rate of the money
supply is increased.
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The need for trades to be ‘‘balanced’’ (satisfy the quid pro quo) at each
exchange ... conflicts with the potential for exploiting all the gains
from trade. The role of money is to attenuate this conflict.
Ostroy and Starr (1990, p. 26)
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Models of bilateral trade have proven to be extremely helpful in capturing the nature of money.1
In these models money is useful because it resolves the con"ict between the need for trades to
satisfy the quid pro quo requirement and the potential for exploiting all the gains from trade.2
A case in point is the random-matching framework pioneered by Kiyotaki and Wright (1991,
1993), which emphasizes the problem of double coincidence of real wants. In this framework,
money improves welfare by increasing the frequency of trades because, with money, production
and exchange can take place in single- as well as in double-coincidence meetings.
Recently, Engineer and Shi (1998), in a random-matching model with indivisible goods and in-
divisible money, have shown that money does not only allow agents to trade in single-coincidence
meetings, but it sometimes also allows agents to attain higher gains from trade in double-
coincidence meetings when they have asymmetric demands for each other’s goods. Unfortunately,
their formalization strategy has yielded ambiguous results, which has left us with the wrong im-
pression that the asymmetric-demand problem, and consequently the bene!t of money in their
model, is less general than the double-coincidence problem emphasized in the random-matching
literature.3
In this paper, we study the role of money in a double-coincidence-of-wants environment (i.e.,
an environment where agents trade in all matches, even without money), and we show why the
asymmetric demand problem encompasses the double-coincidence problem. For this purpose we
consider a random-matching model with perfectly divisible money and divisible goods, where
agents, endowed with money and production opportunities, have the choice of !nancing their
1The !rst models, developed by Ostroy (1973), Starr (1972), and Ostroy and Starr (1974), focused on the
exchange process when bilateral trades are subject to a quid pro quo restriction and when prices are given and
assumed to clear markets. In a second wave of models, Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1991, 1993) introduced random
matching to represent the time-consuming trading process, to see what frictions can make monetary exchange an
equilibrium, and to determine endogenously which objects serve as media of exchange.
2Quid pro quo requires that in any trade the value of the goods delivered by a trader must equal the value of the
goods he receives. The origin of the quid pro quo restriction is that trades must be based on mutual agreements:
a trade is neither a theft nor a gift.
3Engineer and Shi (1998) consider a random-matching model with indivisible goods and indivisible money, where
the matched traders have asymmetric demands for each other’s goods. To endogenize terms of trade, they introduce
divisible service side payments over which agents can bargain. A crucial characteristic of these side payments is
that the marginal cost of producing the services is always greater than the marginal utility of consuming them.
Consequently, production of these side payments is a social waste. In Engineer and Shi’s model, money is useful
because it reduces the production of these ine!cient side payments.
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consumption through current production, the sale of money, or both. The terms of trade, i.e.,
the quantities of goods that are produced, exchanged, and consumed in bilateral meetings, are
determined through bilateral bargaining.
The key result of our model is that in a monetary economy the gains from trade are strictly
larger than the gains from trade in the corresponding barter economy in all asymmetric matches.
Thus, money indeed resolves the con"ict between the quid pro quo requirement and the potential
for exploiting all the gains from trade. The extent to which money mitigates this con"ict depends
on the real value of money. The higher the real value of money, the greater are the realized gains
from trade in asymmetric meetings and the larger is the set of meetings where the traders exploit
all the gains from trade. Consequently, by decreasing the real value of money, an increase in
the in"ation rate unambiguously deteriorates the allocation of resources. As the in"ation rate
increases, the economy moves gradually toward the allocation of the barter economy. Interestingly,
the optimum quantity of money obeys the Friedman rule. Under this rule, the real value of money
attains its maximum, and in each match all the gains from trade are realized.
Money is useful because it modi!es the terms of trade, i.e., the quantities of goods that are
exchanged relative to the quantities the traders would exchange in the same situation in a barter
economy. To capture this terms-of-trade e"ect, we deliberately exclude the frequency e"ect
of money by considering an environment with double coincidence of real wants, where in each
bilateral meeting each agent is a consumer of the other agent’s production. In general, however,
the bilateral meetings are unbalanced in the sense that one agent has stronger preferences for
the good produced by his partner.4 In such an environment, money cannot speed up the rate at
which agents trade (the extensive margin); rather it modi!es the quantities that agents produce
and exchange (the intensive margin).
To explain how money a"ects the terms of trade, consider the bargaining between agents that
have asymmetric preferences for each other’s goods. Without money, they bargain over the quan-
tities that are produced, consumed, and exchanged. The exchanged quantities simultaneously
determine the total surplus of the match and how the traders split this surplus. Because agents
cannot determine the size of the surplus and its split independently, and because each agent only
cares about his own surplus, traders with asymmetric preferences attain a bargaining solution
that does not exploit all the potential gains from trade.
With money, agents bargain over these quantities and over a monetary transfer. Money
improves the terms of trade because it transforms a bargaining game without transferable utility
into one with transferable utility. We therefore consider utility transfer as an important function
of money.5 In order to ful!ll this function, (i) money must be divisible and (ii) it must be
4Single-coincidence meetings, which are at the center in the random-matching literature, are meetings where
agents have exceptionally strong asymmetric preferences: Only one agent likes to consume the good produced by
his partner (see Figure 1).
5A bargaining game is a game with transferable utility if there is a device that allows a player to simultaneously
decrease his own utility payo" and increase that of a partner by the same amount. A two-person bargaining game
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equally valued by all agents.6 Consequently, a monetary transfer does not a"ect the size of the
total surplus of a match, because changes in the payo"s cancel each other. This allows traders
to separate the decisions of how much to produce and how to split the resulting total surplus.
In contrast, real production is an imperfect device for transferring utility, because the marginal
utility of the consumer and the marginal cost of the producer vary with the quantity produced and
exchanged, and, in general, they do not coincide. Consequently, an exchange of real commodities
does not a"ect the payo"s symmetrically, and therefore it a"ects the total surplus of the match.
We introduce asymmetric preferences by assuming that when two agents, i and ", meet, their
preferences for each other’s production good are represented by two random variables !i and !" ,
where !i measures how much agent i likes agent "’s good, and !" measures how much " likes i’s
good. If !i # !" , agent i values agent "’s output more than " values i’s output when the same
quantities are exchanged.
In a barter economy, e!ciency is attained in symmetric matches only, i.e., if !i ! !" . In
asymmetric matches, however, agents produce and exchange ine!cient quantities, and the degree
of ine!ciency increases in the degree of asymmetry. To see why bartering between asymmetric
traders is ine!cient, assume that !i # !" . From a social point of view, agent " should produce
a larger quantity than agent i.7 In a decentralized environment, because of the quid pro quo
restriction, agent " will not agree to such an arrangement: in fact, we show that agent i produces
more than agent ". This result illustrates in a drastic way the ine!ciencies of bartering: the agent
in a match who is more eager to consume produces more and consumes less than his partner.
Consequently, in a barter economy, less-valued goods are overproduced and more highly valued
goods are underproduced.
In contrast to the barter economy, a monetary economy also attains e!ciency in asymmetric
matches if the asymmetry, which we measure by some distance function D (!i, !"), is smaller than
the real value of money holdings. The intuition behind this result is that, in contrast to the
barter economy, agent " will agree to produce and exchange e!cient quantities if agent i is able
to compensate him by transferring claims to future consumption (money). If i’s constraint on
money holding is not binding, then he is able to do so, and i and " produce and exchange e!cient
quantities. If not, the bargaining will result in ine!cient quantities produced and exchanged.
with transferable utility can be fully characterized by the disagreement payo"s of the two players and by the total
transferable wealth available to the players (Myerson, 1991, pp. 384—385). Note that money transfers indirect
utility, because money does not generate direct utility in our model: it is a claim on future consumption.
6Because agents have idiosyncratic preferences, money is the only good that is equally valued by all agents.
This feature is related to one of Williamson and Wright (1994), who study a model where agents have private
information about the goods they produce, and where the bene!t of money arises because it is the only good that
is of universally recognized quality.
7For example, consider a single-coincidence meeting with !i > 0 and !j = 0. Then e!ciency requires that agent
j produce a positive quantity and receive nothing.
4
Figure 1: E!cient and ine!cient trades with and without money.
Figure 1 illustrates, in the space of possible match types [for all (!i, !")], regions with e!cient
and ine!cient trades: without money (Figure 1a), and with money for a certain in"ation rate
(Figure 1b). With money, the quantities exchanged are ine!cient (e!cient) for all ! ! (!i, !")
in the shaded (nonshaded) region – see Figure 1b. Without money, they are e!cient on the
45-degree line and ine!cient for all other ! – see Figure 1a. It is evident that the fraction of
e!cient trades is larger in the monetary economy. Moreover, the degree of ine!ciency (welfare
loss) in any of the matches in the grey area of the monetary economy is strictly smaller than the
degree of ine!ciency of the corresponding match in the barter economy. Note that in Figure 1b
the shaded region of ine!cient trades shrinks when the in"ation rate decreases, and it disappears
completely when money growth obeys the Friedman rule.
Figure 1 is also useful for a comparison of our model with previous search and money models.
In this literature there are four types of meetings, represented by the corners of Figure 1, denoted
%, B, ', and (. At B and ( we have single-coincidence meetings, at ' symmetric double-
coincidence meetings, and at % no coincidence meetings. In this literature, traders attain the
e!cient outcome when they barter (point '), and they exchange ine!cient quantities when they
trade money for goods (points B and (). This suggests – what Figure 1 shows is not true –
that money introduces ine!ciencies into the bargaining that are not present in a barter economy.
Next to Engineer and Shi (1998) discussed above, the articles most closely related to our
work are Engineer and Shi (2001) and Laing et al. (2000). Engineer and Shi (2001) consider
a divisible-goods model where agents with symmetric preferences have asymmetric bargaining
weights in all matches. Ine!cient bartering is a result of these asymmetric bargaining weights.
Unlike Engineer and Shi (2001), we consider symmetric bargaining between agents that have
asymmetric preferences for each other’s good, and we describe bargaining by a strategic game
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rather than an axiomatic solution.
The divisibility of money is an important feature that distinguishes our approach from Engi-
neer and Shi (1998, 2000). Indeed, as shown in Berentsen and Rocheteau (2000), the indivisibility
of money limits the role of money as a utility-transferring device, because it introduces its own
ine!ciencies into the formation of the terms of trade. Moreover, divisible money allows us to
discuss in"ation and to search for the optimal growth rate of the money supply, and it greatly
simpli!es the model and its interpretation.
Laing et al. (2000) consider a model with divisible money and divisible goods in a monopolistic
competition setup. They distinguish !rms and households, and prices are posted by !rms. As in
our model, agents in double-coincidence meetings have the choice of !nancing their consumption
through money, real commodities, or both. In contrast to our model, agents only use one !nancing
method in equilibrium.8
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the environment. In Section 3
we derive and characterize the barter equilibrium, and in Section 4 the monetary equilibrium.
Section 5 provides a discussion of the results, and Section 6 concludes.
8 In the pure monetary equilibrium agents always pay with money. In the mixed trading equilibrium, they pay
with goods in double-coincidence meetings and with money in single-coincidence meetings.
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We consider a random-matching model with divisible goods and divisible money along the lines
of Shi (1999). The economy is populated with a large number of households, each consisting
of a continuum of members of measure one who regard the household’s utility as the common
objective. In the market, household members attempt to exchange money or their production
good for consumption goods. In this attempt household members execute the strategies that
have been given to them by their households. At the end of each period, the members pool
their money holdings, which eliminates aggregate uncertainty for households. In the symmetric
monetary equilibrium, the distribution of money holdings is degenerate across households. This
facilitates the analysis, because we can focus on a representative household.9 Finally, the utility
of the household is de!ned as the sum of the utilities of its members.10
Although households di"er in their preferences and production opportunities, they face the
same decision problems, so that each household and each good can be treated symmetrically.
In the following we refer to an arbitrary household as household h. Decision variables of this
household are denoted by lowercase letters. Capital letters denote other households’ variables,
which are assumed to be given by the representative household h. Finally, variables corresponding
to the next period are indexed by +1.
794 0$3)#":";% &#' <.$-$.$#3$,
The economy consists of a continuum of in!nite-lived households and a continuum of goods, which
are represented by points on the same circle of circumference 2, denoted by C. The goods can
also be viewed as di"erent varieties of the same commodity. Each household is composed of a
continuum of members who share the same technology and have the same preferences. Households
are specialized in consumption and in production. Household h " C has the technology to produce
good h. Producing * units of a good yields disutility c (*) ! *. Goods cannot be stored, and
production is instantaneous. Household members derive utility from consuming all goods other
than their production good. The most preferred good of household h is h!, chosen at random
from C. If we draw at random a commodity k from C, the length l of the arc between k and h! is
uniformly distributed on $%, 1'. The function mapping the distance l and the quantity consumed
* into utility is continuous in both arguments, strictly decreasing in l, and increasing in *. We
9The large-household assumption, extending a similar one in Lucas (1990), avoids di!culties that arise in models
with a nondegenerate distribution of money holdings, and so allows for a tractable analysis of in"ation. In search
models of money, it was !rst used by Shi (1997, 1999, 2001). Lagos and Wright (2001) investigate an alternative
assumption that yields a degenerate distribution of money holdings in random-matching models of divisible money.
10We have also introduced the large household in the indivisible-money, indivisible-goods model of Kiyotaki and
Wright (1991, 1993) and the indivisible-money, divisible-goods model of Trejos and Wright (1995) and Shi (1995).
Interestingly, we have found exactly the same reduced-form equations as in the original models (a proof of this
claim is available on request).
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adopt the following function:11
U(l, *) ! ! (l)u(*)
The function ! (l) is strictly decreasing and twice di"erentiable, and it satis!es ! (%) ! !sup and
! (1) ! %. The utility associated with the consumption of * units of the most preferred good is
!supu(*), whereas the utility of consumption of the worst good is zero. Furthermore, we assume
that u is increasing and twice di"erentiable, and satis!es u (%) ! %, u00 / %, and u0 (%) !#. The
probability that ! is less than 0 " $%, !sup' for a good chosen at random is equal to
P $! (l) $ 0' ! P !l % !"1(0)" ! 1& !"1(0) ' 1 (0)
where 1 (.) is a cumulative distribution with support $%, !sup' and density f .
Finally, the utility of a household in one period is the sum of the consumption utilities of its
members minus their disutilities of production. The discount factor is " " (%, 1).
797 !&(3)+#; &#' !"#$%
Time is discrete. In each period each household member meets another member at random.
Our assumptions about technology and preferences imply that in each match there is a double
coincidence of real wants, i.e., each household is a consumer of the other household’s produc-
tion good.12 In general, however, agents’ preferences for each other’s goods in a match are not
symmetric. For an agent i matched with an agent ", the type of the match is given by the
pair (!i, !") " $%, !sup' × $%, !sup'. From the point of view of agent i’s partner, the match type is
(!" , !i). Generically, (!i, !") 6! (!" , !i). In the following, we adopt the following notation. For all
! ! (!i, !"), !0 ! (!" , !i). Thus, if ! describes the match type from the point of view of agent
i, then !0 describes the match type from the point of view of agent ". For any individual, the
distribution of probabilities of the matches can be described by the measure 4 de!ned as follows:
(% ) $%, !sup'× $%, !sup' , 4 (%) !
# !sup
0
# !sup
0
1A(0, y)f(0)f(y) d0dy
where 1A(0, y) is an indicator function that is equal to one if (0, y) " % and zero otherwise.
In the monetary economy, in addition to consumption goods, there is an intrinsically worthless,
storable, and fully divisible object called !at money. At the beginning of each period, each
household hasm units of money, which it divides evenly among its members, so that each member
holds m units of money in a match. After this, household members are matched and carry out
their exchanges according to the prescribed strategies. Within a period, no member can transfer
money to another member of the same household. Thereafter, members bring back their receipts
of money, and each agent consumes the goods he has bought.
11The analysis would also hold for any utility function satisfying "U(l, q)/"q > 0, "U(l, q)/"l < 0, "2U(l, q)/"q2 <
0, and "2U(l, q)/"q"l < 0.
12 In fact, there are single-coincidence meetings (along the segments ]AB] and ]AD] in Figure 1). The measure
of single-coincidence meetings, however, is zero.
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The terms of trade are determined through bargaining games with alternating o"ers (Rubinstein,
1982). Two important features of the bargaining are that (i) bargaining strategies are determined
at the household level but are carried out by household members, and (ii) bargaining strategies
are determined ex ante for all possible match types, assuming that all future bargaining partners
hold the same level of money holdings. This last feature is consistent with the equilibrium out-
come where the distribution of money holdings is degenerate. Therefore, households’ bargaining
strategies are ex ante optimal. Finally, the equilibrium is fully characterized once we have de-
scribed how households’ members react if a partner unexpectedly shows up with a di"erent level
of money than what is expected in equilibrium. We assume that households’ members play the
strategies they have been instructed to play by their household prior to the matches, no matter
what the level of money holdings of their partner in the match.13
In the following we consider the bargaining between agent i of household h and agent " from
any other household. The bargaining proceeds as follows. Each period is divided into an in!nite
number of subperiods of length !.14 If, in a given subperiod, it is agent i’s turn to make an
o"er and agent " rejects the o"er, then in the following subperiod it is agent "’s turn to make a
countero"er. If an o"er is refused, the negotiation breaks down with probability #! (# # %). If
the negotiation breaks down, the players receive zero "ow utility. Thus, our game is similar to the
bargaining game where agents do not search while bargaining, as considered in Shi (1995) and
Trejos and Wright (1995). The possibility of an exogenous breakdown of the negotiation gives an
incentive to traders to agree immediately.15
In the alternating-o"er game, o"ers and countero"ers converge to the same limiting proposal
when ! goes to zero. Consequently, the !rst-mover advantage vanishes when ! goes to zero.16
Because of this and because, as we will see, it facilitates the derivation of the dynamic equation
describing the marginal utility of money, we let members of household h make the !rst o"er in
all meetings. In equilibrium all households have the same characteristics: as a consequence, !rst
o"ers of household h are always accepted. Moreover, because the length of time between two
13This pricing procedure di"ers from the procedure in Rauch (2000), who assumes that households’ bargaining
strategies are ex post optimal, because they are determined at the level of the household members. This alternative
assumption would not a"ect our results qualitatively, but it would lead to more complicated expressions. See
Berentsen and Rocheteau (2001) for a discussion of the implications of these di"erent assumptions.
14Because the bargaining game takes place within a period, assuming a game with an in!nite number of rounds
is an approximation to a game with a large but !nite number of rounds. This approximation is reasonable, because
the Rubinstein game with a !nite number of rounds converges to the Rubinstein game with an in!nite horizon
when the number of !nite rounds increases without bounds.
15 Instead of a breakdown of the bargaining, a cost of delaying an agreement could arise from the fact that
households discount the future (Shi 2001). Although formally equivalent, this last interpretation is not completely
rigorous in a discrete-time model.
16This argument is standard in the bargaining literature. See, for example, Muthoo (1999, chapter 3), Osborne
and Rubinstein (1990, chapter 3).
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consecutive o"ers is in!nitesimal, the !rst o"ers are equal to the countero"ers that would have
been made by h’s partners.
In the following, we will consider a barter economy and a monetary economy. In a barter
economy, agents i and " bargain over the quantities *$! and *
s
! that are produced, consumed,
and exchanged, where agent " (i) produces commodity *$! (*
s
!) and consumes commodity *
s
! (*
$
!).
The subscript ! indicates that the bargaining solution will depend on the type of match. In a
monetary economy, they also bargain over a monetary transfer 0!, where 0! # % means that agent
i transfers 0! units of money to agent ".
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In order to capture the bene!t of money, we compare the allocation of resources of the barter
economy with that of the monetary economy. In this section we !rst present the barter equilibrium
where money has no value.
=94 0)$ "!$.,
Consider the bargaining between agents i and ". Agent i, following the strategy prescribed by
household h, proposes the terms of trade
$
*$!, *
s
!
%
if the match type is ! ! (!i, !"), i.e., if his
valuation for the good produced by " is !iu
$
*$!
%
and if "’s valuation for the good he produces is
!"u (*
s
!). According to his o"er, *
$
! is the quantity he consumes and agent " produces, and *
s
! is
the quantity he produces and " consumes. If it is agent "’s turn to make an o"er, " proposes
the terms of trade
$
8$!0 , 8
s
!0
%
, where the index !0 indicates that, from the point of view of ", the
match type is !0 ! (!" , !i). According to "’s o"er, 8s!0 is the quantity i consumes and " produces,
and 8$!0 is the quantity i produces and " consumes.
Denote R!0 the expected surplus (or reservation value) of agent " if he rejects the o"er: it is
taken as given by the household of agent i. Agent " will accept any o"er that gives him a utility
larger than R!0 . Consequently, any optimal o"er
$
*$!, *
s
!
%
must satisfy
!"u (*
s
!)& *$! ! R!0 (1)
According to (1), agent i’s o"er makes agent " just indi"erent between accepting and rejecting
the o"er. The expected surplus of agent " equals
R!0 ! (1& #!)
&
!"u
'
8$!0
(
&8s!0
i
(2)
If agent " rejects the o"er, negotiations break down with probability #!. With probability 1&#!
there is no breakdown and agent " makes the countero"er
$
8$!0 , 8
s
!0
%
after a period of time of
length !.
=97 0)$ <.";.&/ "- ()$ )"6,$)":'
A household’s trading strategy consists of the terms of trade
$
*$!, *
s
!
%
for each ! " E, and an
acceptance rule that speci!es whether an o"er is acceptable or not. An o"er is acceptable if
it yields at least the reservation value R!, which is given by an equation that is similar to (2).
To determine the o"ers for each period, the household chooses
$
*$!, *
s
!
%
!#E to solve the following
dynamic programming problem:
V ! max
'b!('
s
!
*#
E
&
!iu
'
*$!
(
& *s!
i
d4 (!i, !") + "V
+
(3)
s.t. (1)
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where V is the lifetime discounted utility of the household h. The right-hand side of equation
(3) has the following interpretation. For each match type !, a member of household h makes
the !rst proposal (*$!, *
s
!) that is immediately accepted by his partner. The net utility in an !-
meeting is then !iu
$
*$!
%&*s!. Note that there is no state variable linking the present to the future.
Consequently, for each period and each match type, households just maximize current utility of
consumption net of current disutility of production. Replacing *$! by its expression given by (1)
and di"erentiating V with respect to *s! yields the following !rst-order conditions:
!iu
0
'
*$!
(
!
1
!"u0 (*s!)
(! " E (4)
According to (4), the terms of trade (*$!, *
s
!) equalize the marginal utility of consumption, !iu
0 $*$!%,
to the marginal disutility of production times the quantity that must be produced to buy an
additional unit of consumption good, 1<!"u0 (*s!). To see this, note that equation (1) implies that
$*s!<$*
$
! ! 1<!"u
0 (*s!). Thus, to buy one additional unit of consumption, agent i must produce
1<!"u
0 (*s!) units of good for agent ", which costs 1<!"u0 (*s!) in terms of utility.
=9= 0)$ 2&.($. $?6+:+2.+6/
Given that all households have the same characteristics, it is natural to focus on a symmetric
barter equilibrium, where all households apply the same trading strategies so that the values of
the di"erent variables of household h equal the values of the same variables of all other households.
Consequently,
$
*$!0 , *
s
!0
%
!
$
8$!0 , 8
s
!0
%
for all !. Then, equations (1) and (2) yield
!"u (*
s
!)& *$! ! (1& #!)
&
!"u
'
*$!0
(
& *s!0
i
(5)
@$!#+(+"# 4 A symmetric barter equilibrium is a set of o!ers
,$
*$!, *
s
!
%-
!#E satisfying equations
(4) and (5).
We want to compare the outcome of the decentralized economy to the allocation that a social
planner would choose. The social planner treats all households symmetrically and consequently
maximizes the utility of a representative household. In the Appendix we show that welfare is
maximized if, for each match type ! " E, the planner chooses the terms of trade (*$!, *s!) that
exploit all the gains from trade, i.e., that maximize the total surplus of the match. For each
match type, the total surplus equals !iu
$
*$!
%&*s!+!"u (*s!)&*$!. Thus, total surplus is maximized
if *$! and *
s
! satisfy
!iu
0
'
*$!
(
! !"u
0 (*s!) ! 1 (! " E (6)
Equation (6) simply states that in a match all the gains from trade are exploited if, for each good,
marginal utility of consumption equals marginal disutility of production. Denote the e!cient
quantities by *$!! and *s!! , respectively.
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In what follows we focus our attention on the limiting case when the length of time between
two consecutive o"ers approaches zero, i.e., ! * %. Then, the o"ers (*$!, *s!) and countero"ers
(*s!0 , *
$
!0) coincide, and the lifetime discounted utilities of all households are equal.
A."<",+(+"# 4 Assume that !* %. Then there is a unique symmetric barter equilibrium where
in all asymmetric matches the quantities exchanged are ine"cient and in all symmetric matches
they are e"cient. Furthermore, in an !-meeting, the quantities traded
$
*$!, *
s
!
%
satisfy (4) and
!"u (*
s
!)& *$!
!iu (*$!)& *s!
!
1
!iu0 (*$!)
(7)
Proposition 1 establishes the existence and uniqueness of the barter equilibrium.17 In this
equilibrium, traders exchange socially ine!cient quantities when they have asymmetric tastes for
each other’s goods, and e!cient quantities when they have symmetric tastes. The reason for
the observed ine!ciencies is that in a barter economy the quantities produced and consumed
determine simultaneously the size and the split of the total surplus of the match. Because
households only care about their own surplus, the traders attain a bargaining solution that does
not maximize the size of the surplus of the match.
The following corollary highlights the ine!ciency of barter trades.
B"."::&.% 4 Consider an (!i, !")-meeting in a barter economy with !i # !". Then *$! / *
$!
! ,
*s! # *
s!
! , and *
$
! / *
s
!. Furthermore, agent i receives more than half of the total surplus of the
match.
Corollary 1 establishes that if agent i likes agent "’s good more, i.e., if !i # !" , then agent i
gets less and agent " more than the e!cient quantities, respectively. Moreover, agent i, who is
more eager to consume than agent ", produces more and consumes less than his partner ", i.e.,
*$! / *
s
!. This result illustrates in a drastic way the ine!ciencies that arise in the barter economy.
Indeed, although exploiting all the gains from trade requires that agent i consume more than he
produces, i.e., *$!! # *s!! , the noncooperative barter equilibrium attains just the opposite outcome.
Finally, agent i receives more than half of the total surplus. One way to correct this ine!ciency is
to endow households with perfect knowledge of all past transactions. With this knowledge there
are punishment strategies that implement the socially e!cient outcome (Kocherlakota 1998).
Finally, we want to emphasize that the barter economy displays a double coincidence of real
wants in all matches. In each match, each household is a consumer of the other household’s
production, the traded quantities yield a positive surplus, and the exchange is quid pro quo.
Nevertheless, in Section 4 we show that a monetary equilibrium exists and that money improves
welfare. In fact, we show that the gains from trade are always higher in the monetary equilibrium.
17Note that the solution
$
qb!, q
s
!
%
of equations (4) and (7) also maximizes the symmetric Nash product, i.e.,$
qb!, q
s
!
%
= argmax
!
!iu
$
qb!
%! qs!" !!ju (qs!)! qb!".
13
C !"#$(&.% $3"#"/%
In this section we consider the monetary economy and compare its equilibrium allocation of
resources with that attained in the barter economy. The environment is exactly the same as in
the barter economy, except that each member of each household holds m units of money when
matched.
At the end of a period, the household receives a lump-sum money transfer % , which can be
negative, and then carries the stock m+1 to t + 1. Because the distribution of money holdings
is degenerate in equilibrium, this will imply m+1 ! &m, where & is the gross growth rate of
the money supply. We restrict & to be larger than the discount factor ".18 If V (m) denotes
the lifetime discounted utility of household h endowed with m units of money, the household’s
marginal value of money is ' ! "V 0(m+1), where V 0(.) is the derivative of V with respect to
money holdings m. Denote by " the marginal value of money of all other households.
C94 0)$ "!$.,
We again restrict our attention to meetings between member i of household h and some agent "
from another household. If, in a given subperiod, it is agent i’s turn to make an o"er, then agent
i, following the strategy prescribed by his household, proposes the terms of trade
$
*$!, *
s
!, 0!
%
if
the match type is ! ! (!i, !"). As in the barter economy, *$! is the quantity of goods produced
by agent " and consumed by agent i, and *s! is the quantity of goods delivered by agent i. The
quantity 0! is the amount of money exchanged. If 0! # %, agent i delivers 0! units of money to
agent ", and if 0! / %, he receives 0! units of money. If it is agent "’s turn to make an o"er, he
proposes the terms of trade
$
8$!0 , 8
s
!0 ,>!0
%
. From "’s point of view, the match type is !0 ! (!" , !i).
If agent " accepts the o"er
$
*$!, *
s
! , 0!
%
, and if 0! # %, the acquired money balances 0! will
increase the stock of money that "’s household will hold at the beginning of the next period.
Because each member is atomistic, the value of the amount of money obtained by member " is
0!".19 Therefore, the surplus of "’s household is equal to "’s consumption utility !"u (*s!) minus
"’s production disutility *$! plus 0!". Agent " accepts the o"er if !"u (*
s
!)& *$!+0!" % R!0 , where
R!0 is the expected surplus of agent " if he rejects the o"er. Thus, any optimal o"er by agent i
satis!es
!"u (*
s
!)& *$! + 0!" ! R!0 (8)
The only di"erence between the barter o"er (1) and the monetary o"er (8) is that the monetary
18When # = $ there exists a continuum of monetary equilibria. In such equilibria money serves purely as a store
of value asymptotically. To focus on the transaction role of money, we restrict # > $.
19To see why, suppose that the measure of a member is µ. Then for the household, the value of x additional
units of money received by a member is $ [V (m%1 + xµ)! V (m%1)]. To express the value of x additional units of
money for a member, we must multiply this quantity by the scale factor 1/µ. Because members are atomistic, we
let µ " 0 to get limµ"0 $[V (m%1 + xµ)! V (m%1)]/µ = x$V 0(m%1) = x%. Thus, from the point of view of the
household, x% is a member’s indirect utility of receiving x units of money in a match.
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o"er includes the monetary transfer 0!. As in Section 3, one can derive an explicit expression for
R!0 . We !nd
R!0 ! (1& #!)
&
!"u
'
8$!0
(
&8s!0 &>!0"
i
(9)
where
$
8$!0 ,8
s
!0 ,>!0
%
is agent "’s proposal when it is his turn to make an o"er. Note that >!0 # %
is a monetary transfer from " to i.
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When the household determines the terms of trade, it is subject to two sets of constraints. First,
household members cannot spend more money than what they have:
0! $ m (! " E (10)
Second, household members cannot ask for more money than what their bargaining partner holds:
&0! $M (! " E (11)
A household’s trading strategy consists of the terms of trade
$
*$!, *
s
!, 0!
%
for each ! " E, and an
acceptance rule for each o"er
$
8$!0 , 8
s
!0 ,>!0
%
by another household. Again, agent i from household
hmakes the !rst o"er, which is immediately accepted by ". For each period, the household choosesn
m+1,
$
*$!, *
s
!, 0!
%
!#E
o
to solve the following dynamic programming problem:
V (m) ! max
'b!('
s
! ()!(m%1
*#
E
&
!iu
'
*$!
(
& *s!
i
d4 (!i, !") + "V (m+1)
+
(12)
subject to the constraints (8), (10), (11), and
m+1 &m ! % &
#
E
0! d4 (!i, !") (13)
The variables taken as given in the above problem are the state variable m and other households’
choices (the uppercase variables). The integral in equation (12) aggregates the net utilities in all
meetings. Equation (13) speci!es the law of motion of the household’s money balances. The !rst
term on the right-hand side speci!es the additional currency the household receives each period.
The second term is the net amount of money received by the household.
Denote by (! the multipliers associated with constraints (10). The multipliers associated with
constraints (11) will be denoted by )!. Then, the program of the household can be rewritten as
follows:
V (m) ! max
'b!('
s
! (m%1
*#
E
&
!iu
'
*$!
(
& *s!
i
d4 (!i, !") +
#
E
(! (m& 0!) d4 (!i, !")
+
#
E
)! (M + 0!) d4 (!i, !") + "V (m+1)
+
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where m+1 is given by equations (13). Furthermore, according to (8), 0! can be expressed as a
function of *s! and *
$
!. The !rst-order conditions and the envelope condition are as follows:
!iu
0
'
*$!
(
!
(! & )! + '
"
(! " E (14)
!"u
0 (*s!) !
"
' + (! & )! (! " E (15)
(! (m& 0!) ! % (! " E (16)
)! (M + 0!) ! % (! " E (17)
'"1
"
!
#
E
$' + (!' d4 (!i, !") (18)
Let us !rst interpret the optimal choices of *$! and *
s
!. For each match type, the household has
two decisions. First, how much to consume. Second, how to !nance this current consumption
– through sale of money, production, or both. The !rst decision implies the equalization of the
marginal utility of consumption to the marginal cost of !nancing this consumption. The second
decision is an arbitrage condition. This condition requires that the value of the amount of money
that the household must pay be equal to the marginal cost of producing additional goods to
!nance this purchase.
To see the relationship between the two choices, note that the !rst-order conditions (14) and
(15) imply the following relation:
!iu
0
'
*$!
(
!
(! & )! + '
"
!
1
!"u0 (*s!)
(! " E (19)
The left-hand side of (19) is the marginal utility of consumption. The middle expression is
the monetary cost of !nancing one additional unit of the consumption good with money. The
right-hand side is the marginal cost of !nancing this unit through production.20 The equality
on the right-hand side of (19) is the arbitrage condition: It requires that these two costs be
equal. To interpret the monetary cost, note from equation (8) that to buy an additional unit
of the consumption good, the household must give up 1<" units of money. Since money has
a marginal discounted value ' in the future, the exchange has an opportunity cost '<". In
addition, the exchange may make the trading constraint (10) more binding and (11) less binding,
thus generating a shadow cost ((! & )!)<". The sum of the opportunity cost of money and the
shadow cost is the monetary cost of !nancing one additional unit of the consumption good.21
20Equation (8) implies that an additional unit of the consumption good requires 1/ [!ju0 (qs!)] units of production
to exchange for.
21Note that the household is willing to produce at a higher marginal cost to !nance additional consumption when
the constraint (10) is binding. In contrast, if (11) is binding, the household has to pay less. The shadow price
&!, therefore, can be interpreted as a discount that the other household is willing to sacri!ce to obtain additional
money if the constraint (11) is binding.
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Equations (16) and (17) are the Kuhn-Tucker conditions associated with the multipliers (!
and )!, respectively. Note from equations (14) and (15) that if the constraints on money holdings
do not bind, i.e., if (! ! )! ! %, the quantities produced and exchanged are socially e!cient.
Finally, equation (18) describes the evolution of the marginal value of money. It states that
the marginal value of money today, '"1<", equals the marginal bene!t of money in all meetings,R
E $' + (!' d4 (!i, !"). This integral has the following interpretation: In an !-meeting the value of
an additional unit of money is equal to ' + (!, which is simply ' if the agent’s cash constraint
is not binding. Note that the value of money is larger in a meeting where the agent’s cash
constraint is binding, because an additional unit of money would allow the agent to reduce
ine!cient production.
C9= 0)$ ,%//$(.+3 $?6+:+2.+6/
Given that all households have the same characteristics, it is natural to focus on a symmetric
equilibrium, where all households apply the same trading strategies so that the values of the
di"erent variables of the household h equal the values of the same variables of all other households.
In a symmetric equilibrium, uppercase variables and lowercase variables are equal: ' ! ",
m ! M , and
$
*$!0 , *
s
!0 , 0!0
%
!
$
8$!0 ,8
s
!0 ,>!0
%
for all !. Then, equations (8) and (9) yield
!"u (*
s
!)& *$! + 0!' ! (1& #!)
&
!"u
'
*$!0
(
& *s!0 & 0!0'
i
(20)
@$!#+(+"# 7 A symmetric monetary steady-state equilibrium is an ' # % and a set,
(*$!, *
s
!, 0!,(!,)!)
-
!#E such that equations (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (20) hold.
We again want to compare the outcome of the decentralized economy with the allocation that
a social planner would choose in order to maximize social welfare. As in the barter economy,
welfare is maximized if in each meeting *$! and *
s
! satisfy !iu
0 $*$!% ! !"u0 (*s!) ! 1. Lemma 1
characterizes the terms of trade in the monetary equilibrium when the length of time between
two consecutive o"ers approaches zero.
D$//& 4 Assume that !* %, and consider an (!i, !")-meeting. Then there are two cases:
Case a% One of the traders’ constraints on money holdings is binding. If agent i’s constraint
on money holding is binding, then *$! / *
$!
! , *
s
! # *
s!
! , 0! ! m, and agent i receives more than
one-half of the total surplus of the match. The exchanged quantities *$! and *
s
! satisfy equations
(19) and
1
!iu0 (*$!)
!
!"u (*
s
!)& *$! +m'
!iu (*$!)& *s! &m'
(21)
Case &% No trader is constrained by his money holdings. Then *$! ! *
$!
! , *
s
! ! *
s!
! , and
0! satis!es the following splitting rule:
!"u (*
s!
! )& *$!! + 0!'
!iu (*$!! )& *s!! & 0!'
! 1 (22)
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According to case b of Lemma 1, if no agent is constrained by his money holdings, then the
matched agents produce, exchange, and consume e!cient quantities, and they split the total
surplus of the match evenly. If the constraint on money holdings of one of the agents is binding
(case a of Lemma 1), then the terms of trade are ine!cient and the agent whose constraint is
binding receives more than half of the total surplus. Note that in Lemma 1 we do not mention
the case when agent "’s constraint on money holding is binding, because by symmetry we would
have *$! # *
$!
! , *
s
! / *
s!
! , 0! ! &m.
To see why monetary trades, in contrast to barter trades, can generate e!cient allocations even
in asymmetric matches, consider a monetary match between agents i and ", with !i # !" . Because
for a given quantity * i’s marginal utility of consumption is higher than "’s, e!ciency requires that
agent " produce a larger quantity than agent i. Agent " will agree to such an arrangement if agent
i is able to compensate him by transferring su!cient claims to future consumption (money). If
i’s constraint on money holding is not binding, he is able to do so, and i and " exchange e!cient
quantities. If not, the bargaining will result in ine!cient quantities produced and exchanged.
Money, in contrast to real production, is a perfect device to transfer utility, because for all
households an additional unit of money has the same real value '.22 Real production, on the
other hand, is an imperfect means to transfer utility, because marginal utility for the consumer
and marginal cost of the producer vary with the quantity produced and exchanged. We want
to emphasize the importance, for e!ciency, of money being equally valued. If money were not
equally valued, according to (14), ine!cient quantities would be produced and exchanged even
if constraints on money holdings were not binding ((! ! )! ! %). For example, if ' # ", which
would mean that household h valued money more than other households, household h would
receive less and produce more than the e!cient quantities.
Finally, Lemma 1 implies that 0! ! &0!0 . Accordingly, because the distribution of match
types is symmetric [i.e., the probability density of the match (!i, !") is equal to the probability
density of the match (!" , !i)], the net amount of money paid by a household to other households
is zero, i.e., #
E
0!d4 (!i, !") ! % (23)
Equation (23) corresponds to the money-market equilibrium condition.
C9C E$'63$'F-"./ $?6&(+"#,
Lemma 1 and the envelope condition (18) allow us to reduce the model to two equations that can
be easily interpreted. Moreover, the reduced-form equations can be related to the search models
of indivisible money of Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995). For a given marginal value of
22All households have the same marginal value of money because the distribution of money is degenerate. In
models with a nondegenerate distribution of money (e.g., Berentsen (2000), Rocheteau (2000), and Zhou (1999)),
the marginal value of money di"ers among agents.
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money ', the terms of trade satisfy'
*$!, *
s
!, 0!
(
! argmax
&
!iu(*
$
!)& *s! & 0!'
i &
!"u(*
s
!)& *$! + 0!'
i
(24)
s.t. &m $ 0! $ m
For given terms of trade
$
*$!, *
s
!, 0!
%
, the marginal value of money satis!es
'"1 ! "
#
E
max
&
!iu
0(*$!)','
i
d4 (!i, !") (25)
Thus, as in Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995), the terms of trade satisfy the axiomatic
Nash solution (see equation (24)). In contrast to their models, however, the bargaining partners
decide not only how much to produce and consume, but also how much money is transferred in
the match.
The envelope condition (25) is very similar to the Bellman equation that characterizes the
value of being a buyer in Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995). It has the following inter-
pretation. For the household, the value of an additional unit of money received at the end of
the previous period, '"1, depends on the use of this unit of money in the current period. In the
current period, this unit of money can be either spent or saved. If it is spent in an !-meeting,
the value of this unit is !iu0(*$!)', because an additional unit of money buys ' units of good,
which when consumed generate !iu0(*$!) additional utility. If the unit of money is saved, its value
is simply '. Note that an additional unit of money is spent if and only if the marginal utility of
consumption is larger than the marginal value of money, i.e., if !iu0(*$!)' # '.
C9G 5#$"3+$#3+$, &#' ()$ .$&: 8&:6$ "- /"#$%
In the following we want to characterize the set of match types that generate ine!cient trades.
To derive this set, we introduce the distance function D(!i, !"), which measures the asymmetry
in preferences in a match. It is de!ned as follows:23
D(!i, !") !
1111* (!i)& * (!")2
1111 (26)
where * (!) ! !u
$
u0"1
$
1
!
%%
+ u0"1
$
1
!
%
. The term !u
$
u0"1
$
1
!
%%
is the consumption utility of an
agent with taste ! who consumes the e!cient quantity *$!! ! u0"1
$
1
!
%
, de!ned in (6), and the
term u0"1
$
1
!
%
is the cost of producing this quantity. Note that * (!i) & * (!") is the surplus of
agent i minus the surplus of agent " when both agents consume and produce e!cient quantities.
A."<",+(+"# 7 There is a & # " such that if & <" (", &), no monetary steady-state equilibrium
exists, and if & " (", &), a unique symmetric monetary steady-state equilibrium with the following
properties exists:
23Note that !(!i, !j) satis!es the three properties of a distance: (i) !(!i, !j) # 0 for all (!i, !j). Furthermore,
!(!i, !j) = 0 only when !i = !j . (ii) !(!i, !j) = !(!j , !i). (iii) !(!i, !j) $ !(!i, !k) +!(!k, !j).
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(i) An (!i, !")-trade is ine"cient if and only if D(!i, !") # m'.
(ii) The measure of ine"cient trades is decreasing in m' and tends to zero as & * ".
The upper limit for the gross growth rate of the money supply satis!es
& ! "
#
E
max
'
!iu
0
'b*$!( , 1( d4(!i, !") (27)
where b*$! is the quantity consumed by an individual in an !-meeting in the barter economy.
Proposition 2 establishes the existence of a unique symmetric monetary steady-state equilib-
rium if the gross growth rate of the money supply & is larger than the discount factor but not too
high. If & # &, !at money is valueless and agents produce and consume the barter quantities.
In contrast to barter trades, monetary trades can generate e!cient allocations in asymmetric
matches. Whether a monetary trade is ine!cient depends on the degree of asymmetry of the
match, as measured by the distance D, and the real stock of money m' (see Figure 1).24 This
result implies three things. First, it is the degree of asymmetry for each other’s goods that matters
for e!ciency. Second, if the real stock of money is large, a randomly chosen match type is less
likely to generate ine!cient terms of trade. In other words, the measure of ine!cient monetary
trades decreases with increasing real value of money. Third, since the real stock of money depends
negatively on the gross growth rate of the money supply (&), money growth reduces e!ciency,
and hence money is not superneutral. In contrast, the Friedman rule is socially e!cient because
it maximizes the real stock of money.
Finally, note that when the gross growth rate of the money supply approaches the upper
bound &, the allocation of resources in the monetary economy converges to the (mis)allocation of
the corresponding barter economy. According to (27), the value of the upper limit & depends on
the size of ine!ciencies in the barter economy. If in the barter economy terms of trade are very
ine!cient, in the sense that in a large fraction of trades !iu0
$b*$!% is large relative to the marginal
cost of production, then a monetary equilibrium exists even for high in"ation rates. For example,
in an environment with a positive measure of single-coincidence meetings, & ! +#. To see this,
note that in single-coincidence meeting with !i # % and !" ! %, !iu0
$b*$!% ! +#. Consequently,
with a positive measure of single-coincidence meetings, a monetary equilibrium exists for any !nite
growth rate of the money supply. In contrast, in a double-coincidence environment with symmetric
preferences, in all meetings !i ! !" and !iu0
$b*$!% ! 1, which implies that & ! ". Consequently, in
symmetric double-coincidence-of-real-wants environments money cannot be valued.
24According to (8), the amount of money that must be spent to buy one additional unit of a good is 1
"
. Hence,
m% can be viewed as a proxy for the real stock of money.
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In the following we want to develop more intuition for the results presented in the previous
sections. To do so, we use the fact that the solution of Rubinstein’s bargaining game between
the households of agents i and " maximizes the symmetric Nash product of the traders’ surpluses
Si and S" , respectively. In what follows we assume, without loss of generality, that !i # !" .
Bargaining solutions and !gures are drawn for a single ! " E only. Note that the !gures are not
just a heuristic exposition but a precise depiction of the households’ behavior.
Consider, !rst, the barter economy where the surpluses of agents i and " are Si ! !iu(*$!)& *s!
and S" ! !"u(*s!) & *$!, respectively. The Pareto frontier of the bargaining set is the concave
curve in Figure 2.25 Each point on this curve uniquely determines what quantities of goods i
and " produce, exchange, and consume. The bargaining solution is determined by the tangency
point between the Pareto frontier and a Nash product curve (the convex curves in Figure 2). The
surpluses of the players at this point are denoted by
'
S+i , S
+
"
(
. Note that
'
S+i , S
+
"
(
is located
to the right of the 45-degree line, which means that i gets more than half of the surplus (see
Corollary 1).
Figure 2: Socially Ine!cient Bartering
The line S!S! represents every possible split (Si, S") of the maximal total surplus of the match
S! ! S!i +S
!
" where S
!
i ! !iu(*
$!
! )&*s!! and S!" ! !"u(*s!! )&*$!! . Consequently, S!S! is the Pareto
frontier of the same bargaining game with transferable utility. A bargaining game is said to have
transferable utility if there is a device that allows a player to decrease his own payo" and increase
that of a partner by the same amount. A two-person bargaining game with transferable utility is
25See the appendix for a formal derivation of the Pareto frontier and some of the other technical details.
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fully characterized by the disagreement payo"s of the two players and by the total transferable
wealth (S!) available to the players i and ".
Bartering is socially ine!cient because (S+i , S
+
" ) <" S!S!, which means that the terms of trade
do not exploit all the gains from trade, i.e., they do not maximize the total surplus of the match.
Note that !i # !" implies S!i # S
!
" and that if the asymmetry in preferences is large, S
!
" may be
negative. Moreover, at (S!i , S
!
" ) the slope of the Pareto frontier is &1. Hence, (S!i , S!" ) is at the
tangency point between the Pareto frontier and the line S!S!.
In the barter economy agents have no device to transfer utility, which implies that (S!i , S
!
" )
is the only feasible split of the maximal total surplus S!. If, however, the traders had a device
to transfer utility, they could attain any point on S!S! by producing and consuming e!cient
quantities, and then split the total utility S! through a transfer of utility. Note that the Nash
product curve (see the dotted curve in Figure 2) has a tangency at the line S!S! where this line
crosses the 45-degree line. Consequently, if agents could transfer utility, they would produce and
exchange e!cient quantities and then exchange utility to attain Si ! S" ! S!<2.
We next discuss how the Pareto frontier is transformed when money is introduced into the
economy. To do so, we consider a household’s trade decisions for one particular match, where
a member of the household (agent i) meets a member of another household (agent ").26 In the
monetary economy, the surpluses of agents i and " are S,i ! !iu(*
$
!) & *s! & 0!' and S," !
!"u(*
s
!) & *$! + 0!', respectively. The transformation is displayed in Figure 3, where the Pareto
frontier of the barter economy is the dotted concave curve and the Pareto frontier of the monetary
economy is the solid concave curve. There is again the line S!S! that represents every possible
split (Si, S") of the maximal total surplus of the match.
To see how the transformation works, consider point % in Figure 3, which lies on the Pareto
frontier of the barter economy and the associated segment $%0, %00'. Point % uniquely determines
what quantities of goods agents i and " produce and exchange. The segment $%0, %00' represents the
set of surpluses that i and " can reach by transferring money without changing these quantities.
At %0 [%00] player " [i] receives m units of money, so that %0 ! (Si &m', S" +m') [%00 !
(Si +m', S" &m')]. Note that the slope of the segment $%0, %00' is &1, because households have
the same constant marginal value of money.
26Since this particular match is one of many trades that the household experiences in the period, the household’s
decisions for this match have negligible in"uence on the household’s total stock of money and the marginal value
of money, %. Thus, in this exposition, m% is taken as given.
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Figure 3: Pareto frontier with and without money.
As drawn in Figure 3, only point %0 lies on the Pareto frontier of the bargaining set in the
monetary economy. This is true for any point on the Pareto frontier of the barter economy that
satis!es Si / S!i . In contrast, if Si # S
!
i , the point %
00 ! (Si +m', S" &m') would lie on the
Pareto frontier of the monetary economy. If Si ! S!i , the points %
0 ! (Si &m', S" +m') and
%00 ! (Si +m', S" &m'), and consequently the whole segment $%0%00', would lie on the Pareto
frontier of the bargaining set of the monetary economy. Note that in this case, the segment $%0%00'
lies on the line S!S!.
If agents had a device to transfer utility, they could attain all points on the line S!S!. In the
monetary economy, divisible money is such a device, in the sense that agents can attain all points
on S!S! satisfying Si " $S!i &m'/S!i +m''. However, money does not transfer utility perfectly,
because the Pareto frontier in the monetary economy does not fully coincide with S!S!. The
extent to which money transfers utility perfectly depends positively on the real value of money
holdings m': A higher real value of money corresponds to a larger part of the Pareto frontier
that fully coincides with S!S!.
Note that under the Friedman rule for all types of matches, we have S!<2 " $S!i &m'/S!i +m''.
Thus, under the Friedman rule the real value of money is high enough to allow agents to split
evenly the total surplus of all matches when socially e!cient quantities are produced. Conse-
quently, in all matches all gains from trade are realized.
An important point to note from Figure 3 is that the set of agreements that can be reached in
the monetary economy contains the set of agreements that can be reached in the barter economy.27
Thus, with valued money the total surplus in a match can never be lower than the total surplus
27Note that money does not enlarge the set of feasible transactions; traders can exchange any quantity of goods,
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attained in the corresponding barter economy. Consequently, welfare in a monetary economy
must be at least as large as in the corresponding barter economy. This result is similar to results
obtained in the theory of international trade, where allowing trade is never welfare-decreasing
relative to autarky, simply because countries have always the option not to trade. In our model,
agents can always choose to barter, which implies that introducing valued !at money can never
decrease welfare.
This last point is even more general: If we compare two monetary economies with respective
gross growth rates of the money supply &1 # &2, we have (m')2 # (m')1. Consequently, the
set of agreements that can be reached in the monetary economy with rate &2 contains the set
of agreements that can be reached in the monetary economy with rate &1. Thus, welfare in a
monetary economy with rate &2 must be at least as large as in an monetary economy with rate
&1. This explains intuitively how the welfare-improving role of money is linked to the real value
of money holdings.
Figure 4: E!cient and ine!cient trades in the monetary economy.
In the monetary economy traded quantities are e!cient if the asymmetry in preferences mea-
sured by the distance D(., .) de!ned in equation (26) is lower than the real value of money. Figure
4 displays an asymmetric match where e!cient quantities are exchanged (a) and an asymmetric
match where ine!cient quantities are traded (b). The dotted curves are the Pareto frontiers of
the bargaining set in the barter economy. The real value of money (m') is larger in Figure 4a
than in Figure 4b, because the segment of the Pareto frontier that lies on the line S!S! is larger
with or without money. The bene!t of money arises because it allows production and exchange of goods that would
not satisfy the quid pro quo requirement without a transfer of money. For a similar argument consider Ostroy
(1973).
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on the left. Remember that the real value of money depends on the rate of growth of the money
supply.
In Figure 5 we show how the distance D (!i, !") can be represented in the graphs of the previous
!gures. A trade is socially ine!cient if the surplus of " when he produces the socially e!cient
quantities and when he receives m units of money is still smaller than S!<2. The point E,
represents the surpluses of agents when e!cient quantities are traded and when agents split the
total surplus equally. Point E+ is the e!cient allocation when agents produce e!cient quantities
and do not exchange money. To reach point E, from E+, agent i must transfer
S!
2
& S!" !
S!i & S!"
2
in terms of utility to ". Thus, if (S!i &S!" )<2 $ m', the traders can attain E, , because agent i’s
real value of money holdings is su!ciently large. If, in contrast, (S!i & S!" )<2 # m', the traders
cannot attain allocation E, , because agent i has not enough money to compensate ".
Figure 5: Frontier between e!cient and none!cient trades.
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Most models that have captured the role of money as a medium of exchange have emphasized
either its ability to increase the volume of trades or its ability to solve an information problem.
In this paper we have focused on a complementary role by addressing the following question: Can
money improve welfare in a double-coincidence-of-real-wants environment where in each bilateral
meeting each agent is a consumer of the other agent’s production?
Our answer is positive: If individuals have asymmetric preferences for each other’s goods,
money generates a strictly better allocation of resources. To study this question, we have consid-
ered a random-matching model with divisible money and divisible real commodities, where agents
have the choice to !nance current consumption with either money, real production, or both. In
contrast to previous search models of money, in our environment money neither increases the
frequency of trades nor solves an information problem. Rather, the welfare-improving role of
money is based on its ability to allow agents to exploit higher gains from trade in asymmetric
meetings than from trade attained in the same meetings in a barter economy.
We have found that if in a match the real value of money is su!ciently large, the traders
produce, consume, and exchange socially e!cient quantities, and they use money to split the
total surplus of the match evenly. We have also shown that agents produce and consume the
same (socially e!cient) quantities and attain the same surpluses as if they had a device that
allowed them to transfer utility perfectly, i.e., a device that allowed each agent to reduce her own
payo" and increase the payo" of her partner in a match by the same amount. Thus, money is a
device that transfers utility perfectly if its value is su!ciently high. The bene!t of money arises
because it allows agents to separate the decisions of how much to produce and exchange and how
to split the resulting total surplus.
Although money is welfare-improving, ine!cient monetary trades can occur if the degree of
asymmetry in a match (measured by some distance) is larger than the real quantity of money,
which is decreasing in the in"ation rate. Consequently, in"ation is costly in that it generates
a misallocation of resources. A higher rate of expansion of the money supply increases the
misallocation because it reduces the set of meetings where agents produce and exchange socially
e!cient quantities. When the gross growth rate of the money supply approaches some upper
bound, the allocation of resources in the monetary economy converges to the (mis)allocation of
the corresponding barter economy. In contrast, when the gross growth rate of the money supply
approaches the discount factor, almost all trades are e!cient, i.e., the Friedman rule holds.
There are several ways to extend our analysis. An interesting extension is to consider nonde-
generate distributions of money holdings. With such a distribution, the marginal value of money
will be di"erent among individuals, and this could a"ect the role of money as a device to transfer
utility. One could also consider a dual-currency or a two-countries and two-monies version of the
model to study the determination of exchange rates and to compare the welfare properties of the
model with those of the one-currency model. Finally, one could add some search externalities (by
26
endogenizing the search intensity of traders, for instance) to see under which circumstances the
Friedman rule still holds.
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Appendix
149 I$:-&.$ In the main text we compare the outcome of the decentralized economy with
the outcome that a planner would choose in order to maximize welfare W . The social planner
treats all households symmetrically and consequently maximizes the expected lifetime utility of
the representative household W subject to the constraint that (*$!, *
s
!) must be equal to (*
s
!0 , *
$
!0):
max
'b!('
s
!
W !
R
E
!
!iu
$
*$!
%& *s!" d4 (!i, !")
1& " s.t. *
$
! ! *
s
!0 and *
s
! ! *
$
!0 (28)
The problem can be reformulated as follows:
max
'b!('
s
!
W !
R
E0
!
!iu
$
*$!
%& *s! + !"u (*s!)& *$!" d4 (!i, !")
1& "
where E0 ! {(!i, !") " E| !i % !"}. The !rst-order conditions are
!iu
0
'
*$!
(
! 1 (! " E
!"u
0 (*s!) ! 1 (! " E
179 A.""- "- A."<",+(+"# 49 The demonstration proceeds in two parts.
A&.( 4J @$($./+#&(+"# "- ()$ ($./, "- (.&'$.
Relabelling equation (5) yields
!iu (*
s
!0)& *$!0 ! (1& #!)
&
!iu
'
*$!
(
& *s!
i
(29)
For any !, the terms of trade (*$!, *
s
!) and (*
$
!0 , *
s
!0) are determined simultaneously and satisfy
(4), (5), (29), and again (4) where (!i, !") is replaced by (!" , !i). In the following, we consider the
solution when !* %. First, equations (4), (5), and (29) imply that lim!$0 *$! ! lim!$0 *s!0 and
lim!$0 *s! ! lim!$0 *$!0 . Second, rearrange equations (5) and (29) to get&
!"u (*
s
!)& !"u
'
*$!0
(i
&
'
*$! & *s!0
(
! &#!
&
!"u
'
*$!0
(
& *s!0
i
&
!iu (*
s
!0)& !iu
'
*$!
(i
&
'
*$!0 & *s!
(
! &#!
&
!iu
'
*$!
(
& *s!
i
Divide the two last equations, use equation (4), and take the limit !* % to get (7).28
A&.( 7J KL+,($#3$ &#' M#+?6$#$,,9
Equation (4) de!nes a negative relationship between *$! and *
s
!. Furthermore, according to (4),
lim's!$0 *
$
! ! +# and lim's!$+% *$! ! %. Equation (7) de!nes a positive relationship between
*$! and *
s
!. Furthermore, according to (7), lim's!$0 *
$
! ! % and lim's!$+% *
$
! ! +#. Hence, the
terms of trade
$
*$!, *
s
!
%
are the unique solution of equations (4) and (7). Accordingly, the barter
equilibrium exists and is unique.!
28For more details and a related demonstration, see Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, Section 4.4) and Muthoo
(1999).
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1=9 A.""- "- B"."::&.% 49 Note, !rst, that !i # !" implies that *$!! # *s!! . Assume, next,
that *$! % *$!! . This implies that !iu0
$
*$!
% $ !iu0 $*$!! % ! 1. Equation (4) implies *s!! % *s! and
therefore
!iu
'
*$!
(
& *s! % !iu
'
*$!!
(
& *s!! # !"u (*s!! )& *$!! % !"u (*s!)& *$! (30)
According to (7), !"u (*s!)& *$! % !iu
$
*$!
%& *s!, which contradicts (30). Thus, if !i # !" , we must
have *$! / *
$!
! and, by (4), *
s
! # *
s!
! .
To see how the traders split the total surplus of the match, manipulate equation (7) to get
!iu
'
*$!
(
& *s! !
!iu
0 $*$!%
1 + !iu0 (*$!)
n
!iu
'
*$!
(
& *$! + !"u (*s!)& *s!
o
(31)
Note, !rst, that *$! / *
$!
! implies !iu
0 $*$!% # !iu0 $*$!! % ! 1. This and equation (31) imply that i’s
fraction of the total surplus is !iu0(*$!)<$1 + !iu0(*$!)' #
1
2 .
To establish that *$! / *
s
!, rewrite (7) as follows:
!iu
0
'
*$!
( &
!"u (*
s
!)& *$!
i
! !iu
'
*$!
(
& *s!
Using (4) and after some manipulation, we obtain
u (*s!)
u0 (*s!)
+ *s! ! !iu
0
'
*$!
(3u $*$!%
u0 (*$!)
+ *$!
4
From the fact that !iu0
$
*$!
%
# 1 we deduce that
u (*s!)
u0 (*s!)
+ *s! #
u
$
*$!
%
u0 (*$!)
+ *$!
Consequently *$! / *
s
!.!
1C9 A.""- "- D$//& 49 By relabelling equation (20), we get
!iu (*
s
!0)& *$!0 + 0!0' ! (1& #!)
&
!iu
'
*$!
(
& *s! & 0!'
i
(32)
For any ! and a given (*$!0 , *
s
!0 , 0!0), the o"ers (*
$
!, *
s
!, 0!) and multipliers ((!,)!) are determined
by equations (14)—(17) and (20). Moreover, for any ! and for a given (*$!, *
s
!, 0!), the o"ers
(*$!0 , *
s
!0 , 0!0) and multipliers ((!0 ,)!0), are determined by equation (32) and by equations (14)—
(17) where (!i, !") is replaced by (!" , !i).
Note, !rst, that equations (19), (20), and (32) imply that lim!$0 *$! ! lim!$0 *s!0 , lim!$0 *
s
! !
lim!$0 *$!0 , and lim!$0 0! ! lim!$0&0!0 . Moreover, (! and )!0 are either both positive or both
equal to zero. To see this, suppose to the contrary that (! # % and )!0 ! %. From (19),
)!0 ! % + *$!0 % *$!!0 ! *s!! and *s!0 $ *s!!0 ! *$!!
(! # % + *$! # *$!! and *s! / *s!!
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Furthermore, from (32),
lim
!$0
!iu (*
s
!0)& !iu
'
*$!
(
+ *s! & *$!0 ! lim
!$0
$& (0! + 0!0)''
The left-hand side is negative. Hence, the right-hand side must be negative too, which implies
that 0!0 # m. This is impossible.
Note, next, that equations (16) and (17) imply that (! and )! cannot be positive at the same
time. Consequently, there are two cases:
B&,$ N&OJ (! # % and )! ! % or (! ! % and )! # %
Let us consider, !rst, (! # % and )! ! %. This implies that the constraint on money holdings
of agent i is binding and 0! ! m. It also implies lim!$0 0!0 ! &m, lim!$0 (!0 ! %, and
lim!$0 )!0 ! '(!<((! + '). To see this, note that when ! approaches zero, (14) and (15) imply
that
'
' & )0!
!
(! + '
'
.
If )! ! %, the !rst-order conditions (14) and (15) equal
!iu
0
'
*$!
(
!
(! + '
'
(33)
!"u
0 (*s!) !
'
' + (!
(34)
Equations (33) and (34) imply that if agent i’s constraint is binding, !iu0
$
*$!
%
# 1 # !"u
0 (*s!),
that is, the quantity *$! produced and consumed is ine!ciently low and the quantity *
s
! produced
and consumed is ine!ciently large.
By rearranging (20) and (32), and by dividing these two equations, we get!
!"u (*
s
!)& !"u
$
*$!0
%"& $*$! & *s!0%+ (0! + 0!0)'!
!iu
$
*s!0
%& !iu (*$!)"& $*$!0 & *s!%+ (0! + 0!0)' ! !"u
$
*$!0
%& *s!0 & 0!0'
!iu (*$!)& *s! & 0!'
(35)
Take the limit as !* % and use (19) to get equation (21). If agent i is constrained by his money
holdings, he receives more than one-half of the total surplus of the match. To see this, consider
the following equation, which is derived from equation (21):
!"u(*
s
!)& *$! +m' !
'
2' + (!
&
!iu(*
$
!)& *$! + !"u(*s!)& *s!
i
(36)
According to (36), agent "’s fraction of the total surplus of the match is endogenous and depends
on the ratio of the shadow price (! to the marginal utility of money '. If (! # %, then '<(2' +
(!) /
1
2 and therefore !"u(*
s
!)& *$! +m' / !iu(*$!)& *s! &m'.
Next, consider (! ! % and )! # %. The constraint on money holdings of agent " is binding:
0! ! &m. This implies lim!$0 0!0 ! m, lim!$0 (!0 ! ')!<()!+'), and lim!$0 )!0 ! %. Hence,
we have
$
*$!, *
s
!
%
!
$
*s!0 , *
$
!0
%
, where
$
*$!0 , *
s
!0
%
satis!es (19) and (21).
B&,$ N2OJ (! ! % and )! ! %
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This implies lim!$0 (!0 ! lim!$0 )!0 ! %. The !rst-order conditions (14) and (15) imply that
*$! ! *
!$
! and *
s
! ! *
!s
! . Agents i and " trade e!cient quantities. Equations (20) and (32) imply
that if !* %, we get an equation analogous to (35), and then (22): Traders split the total surplus
of the match equally.!
1G9 A.""- "- A."<",+(+"# 7 The demonstration proceeds in !ve steps.
4,( ,($<: Determination of the set I ! I 0 , I 00 (see Figure 6).
Denote by I 0 ) E the set of (!i, !") such that (! # %. Note that (! # % implies that the constraint
on agent i’s money holdings is binding and !i # !" . It also implies that agents i and " exchange 169J Not
i0s?ine!cient quantities and they do not split the total surplus of the match equally. Hence, (! # %
if (22) is satis!ed for a value of 0! # m. Thus,
1 #
!"u (*
s!
! )& *$!! +m'
!iu (*$!! )& *s!! &m'
(37)
From (6) we have *$!! ! u0"1 (1<!i) and *s!! ! u0"1 (1<!"). Consequently, condition (37) can be
rewritten as
* (!i)& * (!") # 2m' (38)
Thus, condition (38) is equivalent to D(!i, !") # m'.
Denote by e! ! (e!i,e!") the value of ! such that (38) is satis!ed with equality:
* (e!i)& * (e!") ! 2m' (39)
Equation (39) implicitly de!nes a function F such that e!" ! F (e!i,m'). Equation (39) implies
that F1 (e!i,m') ! $e!"<$e!i # % and that F2 (e!i,m') ! $e!"<$m' / %. Furthermore, for all
m' # %, we have F (!sup/m') / !sup, and there exists b!(m') # % such that F (b!/m') ! % (see
Figure 5). Consequently, the set I 0 is de!ned as follows:
I 0 ! {(!i, !") " E |* (!i)& * (!") # 2m'}
! {(!i, !") " E |!" / F (!i)}
By symmetry, we can de!ne the set I 00 of ! such that )! # %:
I 00 !
,
(!i, !") " E
11(!" , !i) " I 0-
Accordingly, I ! I 0 , I 00. See Figure 5.
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Figure 6: Set of ine!ciencies.
7#' ,($< : The measure of ine!cient trades.
In order to measure the set of ine!cient trades, it is useful to introduce the indicator function
1A(0) that is equal to one if 0 " % and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, because of the symmetry of
the sets I 0 and I 00 we have 4 (I) ! 24 (I 0).
Let us calculate 4 (I 0). By de!nition,
4
$
I 0
%
!
#
1[0($(!i;m")[(!") d4 (!i, !") !
#
[0(!sup]
6#
[0(!sup]
1[0($(!i;m")[(!") d1 (!")
7
d1 (!i)
This integral indicates that we measure the set of points such that !" / F (!i) with the measure
4. The integral
R
[0(!sup]
1[0($(!i;m")[(!") d1 (!") !
R $(!i;m")
0 d1 (!") is equal to 1 $F (!i/m')' for
all !i # b! and zero otherwise. Hence,
4
$
I 0
%
!
#
[b!(!sup] 1 $F (!i/m')' d1 (!i)
By di"erentiating 4 (I 0) with respect to m' we get
$4 (I 0)
$m'
!
#
[b!(!sup] f $F (!i/m')'×F2 (!i/m') d1 (!i)& 1 $F (b!/m')' $b!$m'
Because 1 $F (b!/m')' ! %, we have
$4 (I 0)
$m'
!
#
[b!(!sup] f $F (!i/m')'×F2 (!i/m') d1 (!i) / %
Consequently, the set of ine!ciencies 4 (I) ! 24 (I 0) is decreasing in m'.
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=.' ,($<: Determination of m'.
The quantity m' is determined by the envelope condition (18), which can be rewritten as follows:
'"1
"
!
#
I0
(! d4(!i, !") + '
By dividing by '<", we get
'"1
'
! "
*#
I0
(!
'
d4(!i, !") + 1
+
(40)
The rate of growth of money supply is & & 1. Thus,
m
m"1
! &
In the steady state, *$! ! *
$
!("1 and *s! ! *s!("1 for all !. In the following we demonstrate that *$!
and *s! depend on m', which implies that m' is constant in the steady state, and therefore
'"1
'
! &
Hence, equation (40) gives
& ! "
*#
I0
(!
'
d4(!i, !") + 1
+
(41)
Equations (33) and (34) imply that *$! is decreasing in (!<' and *
s
! is increasing in (!<'. If
(! # %, then !iu0(*$!) # 1 and !"u0(*s!) / 1. Hence, the left-hand side of (36) is increasing in (!<',
and the right-hand side of (36) is decreasing in (!<'. Consequently, equation (36) determines a
unique value for (!<'. Moreover,
$ #!"
$m'
/ %,
$*$!
$m'
# %,
$*s!
$m'
/ %
Equation (36) implicitly de!nes a function +(!/m') ! (!<' for all ! " I 0 with $+<$m' / %.
Consequently, equation (41) can be rewritten as
& ! "
*#
I0
+(!/m') d4(!i, !") + 1
+
(42)
From (42), m' is entirely characterized by the following equation:
# (m') !
&
"
& 1 (43)
where # (m') !
R
I0 +(!/m') d4(!i, !"). By di"erentiating (43) with respect to m', we !nd
#0 / % as long as 4 (I 0) # %. This implies that if there is a m' # % satisfying (43) such that
4 (I 0) # %, then it is unique.
C() ,($<: Existence of a unique monetary equilibrium.
For existence and uniqueness we need to show that there is unique 0 # % satisfying # (0) ! $% &1.
To do this we study the properties of # (0). Let us !rst derive # (%). If m' ! %, equations
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(14) and (36) are equivalent to (31), and we have *s! ! b*s! and *$! ! b*$!, where b*s! and b*$! are the
quantities exchanged in the barter economy. Furthermore,
(!
'
! !iu
0
'b*$!(& 1
Then
# (%) !
#
E
max
'
!iu
0
'b*$!(& 1, %( d4(!i, !") # %
Second, there is a critical value 0 # % such that for all 0 % 0, # (0) ! % and for all 0 / 0,
# (0) # %. To see this, note that equation (37) implies that I 0 ! - when m' is large enough.
Finally, from step 3, #0 (0) / % if 0 / 0.
We conclude that equation (43) determines a unique positive value of m' if & " (", &), where
& ! "
#
E
max
'
!iu
0
'b*$!( , 1( d4(!i, !")
G() ,($<: The limit case & * ".
From (43), # (m')* %, that is,
lim
$$%
#
I0
(!
'
d4(!i, !") ! %
This implies that lim$$% 4 (I 0) ! %: in the limit traders exchange e!cient quantities in all
matches.!
1H9 @$.+8&(+"# "- ()$ A&.$(" -."#(+$. "- ()$ 2&.;&+#+#; ,$( The surpluses of agents i
and " are
Si ! !iu(*
$
!)& *s! & 0!' (44)
S" ! !"u(*
s
!)& *$! + 0!' (45)
The Pareto frontier of the bargaining set is the set of pairs (Si, S") such that it is not possible to
increase Si without decreasing S" . Formally, the Pareto frontier is determined by the following
program:
max
'b!('
s
! ()!
Si ! !iu(*
$
!)& *s! & 0!'
s.t. !"u(*s!)& *$! + 0!' % S" (46)
&m $ 0! (47)
0! $ m (48)
Denote by 4!, (!, and )! the multipliers associated with the inequalities (46), (47), and (48),
respectively. In a barter economy ' ! %, whereas in a monetary economy ' # %.
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• 0)$ A&.$(" -."#(+$. +# ()$ 2&.($. $3"#"/%
The Lagrangian of this program is
L ! !iu(*$!)& *s! + 4!
&
!"u(*
s
!)& *$! & S"
i
The !rst-order conditions with respect to *$! and *
s
! are
!iu
0(*$!) ! 4! (49)
!"u
0(*s!) !
1
4!
(50)
From (49) and (50) we have
!i!"u
0(*$!)u
0(*s!) ! 1 (51)
Equations (44), (45), and (51) de!ne a negative relationship between Si and S" , which is the
Pareto frontier denoted by P+. One can show that the slope of P+ is negative, i.e., dS"<dSi !
&1<!iu0(*$!) / %. Moreover, because Si is an increasing function of *$!, P+ is concave, i.e.,
d2S"<dS
2
i / %.
• 0)$ A&.$(" -."#(+$. +# ()$ /"#$(&.% $3"#"/%
The Pareto frontier in the monetary economy is denoted by P, . The Lagrangian has the
following expression:
L ! !iu(*$!)& *s! & 0!' + 4!
&
!"u(*
s
!)& *$! + 0!' & S"
i
& (! (0! &m) + )! (0! +m)
The !rst-order conditions with respect to *$!, *
s
! and 0! are
!iu
0(*$!) ! 4! (52)
!"u
0(*s!) !
1
4!
(53)
' (4! & 1) ! (! & )! (54)
Again, from (52) and (53) we !nd that
!i!"u
0(*$!)u
0(*s!) ! 1 (55)
There are three cases to distinguish: (i) (! ! )! ! %, (ii) (! # % and )! ! %, and (iii) (! ! % and
)! # %.
B&,$ N+O: (! ! )! ! %
From (54) we have 4! ! 1. From (52) and (53) *
$
! ! *
$!
! and *
s
! ! *
s!
! . As a consequence,
according to (44) and (45),
Si ! S
!
i & 0!', S" ! S!" + 0!', and Si + S" ! S!
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If the constraints on money holdings are not binding, the points of the Pareto frontier lie on the
line S!S!. Moreover, the constraint &m $ 0! $ m can be rewritten as follows:
&m' + S!i $ Si $ m' + S!i
B&,$ N++O : (! # % and )! ! %
We have 0! ! m and, from (54), 4! ! 1 +
#!
" . Hence, one can see that (52) and (53) are
exactly the !rst-order conditions of the program of the household. Furthermore, (44) and (45)
yield
Si +m' ! !iu(*
$
!)& *s!
S" &m' ! !"u(*s!)& *$!
Given that
$
*$!, *
s
!
%
satis!es (51), we deduce that (Si +m', S" &m') " P+. Furthermore, the
condition (! # % implies 4! # 1 and *
$
! / *
$!
! and *
s
! # *
s!
! . As a consequence, Si +m' / S
!
i .
B&,$ N+++O : (! ! % and )! # %.
The reasoning is similar to case (ii). We have 0! ! &m and (Si &m', S" +m') " P+. This
occurs when Si &m' # S!i .
36
D+($.&(6.$
Berentsen, Aleksander, “Money Inventories in Search Equilibrium,” Journal of Money, Credit,
and Banking 32 (2000), 168—178.
Berentsen, Aleksander and Guillaume Rocheteau, “On the E!ciency of Monetary Exchange: How
Divisibility of Money Matters,” Mimeo (2000).
Berentsen, Aleksander and Guillaume Rocheteau, “A note on the Friedman Rule in Search Models
of Money,” Mimeo (2001).
Engineer, Merwan and Shouyong Shi, “Asymmetry, Imperfectly Transferable Utility, and the
Role of Fiat Money in Improving Terms of Trade,” Journal of Monetary Economics 41 (1998),
153—183.
Engineer, Merwan and Shouyong Shi, “Bargains, Barter, and Money,” Review of Economic Dy-
namics 4 (2001), 188—209.
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro and Randall Wright, “On Money as a Medium of Exchange,” Journal of
Political Economy 97 (1989), 927—954.
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro and Randall Wright, “A Contribution to the Pure Theory of Money,” Journal
of Economic Theory 53 (1991), 215—235.
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro and Randall Wright, “A Search-Theoretic Approach to Monetary Economics,”
American Economic Review 83 (1993), 63—77.
Kocherlakota, Narayana, “Money is Memory,” Journal of Economic Theory 81 (1998), 232—251.
Lagos, Ricardo and Randall Wright, “A Uni!ed Framework for Monetary Theory and Policy
Analysis,” Mimeo (2001).
Laing, Derek, Victor Li, and Ping Wang, “Money and Matching in a Multiple Matching Decen-
tralized Trading Model,” Mimeo (2000).
Muthoo, Abhinay, Bargaining Theory with Applications (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999).
Myerson B. Roger, Game Theory: Analysis of Con"ict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1991).
Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, Bargaining and Markets (San Diego: Academic Press, 1990).
Ostroy, Joseph, “The Informational E!ciency of Monetary Exchange,” American Economic Re-
view 63 (1973), 597—610.
Ostroy, Joseph and Ross Starr, “Money and the Decentralization of Exchange,” Econometrica 42
(1974), 1093—1113.
Ostroy, Joseph and Ross Starr, “The Transactions Role of Money,” in Benjamin M. Friedman
and Frank H. Hahn, eds., Handbook of Monetary Economics (Elsevier Science, 1990).
Rauch, Bernhard, “A Divisible Search Model of Fiat Money: A Comment,” Econometrica 68
(2000), 149—156.
37
Rocheteau, Guillaume, “La Quantité Optimale de Monnaie dans un Modèle avec Appariements
Aléatoires,” Les Annales d’Economie et Statistique 58 (2000).
Rubinstein, Ariel, “Perfect Equilibrium in Bargaining Model,” Econometrica 50 (1982), 97—109.
Shi, Shouyong, “Money and Prices: A Model of Search and Bargaining,” Journal of Economic
Theory 67 (1995), 467—496.
Shi, Shouyong, “A Divisible Search Model of Fiat Money,” Econometrica 65 (1997), 75—102.
Shi, Shouyong, “Search, In"ation and Capital Accumulation,” Journal of Monetary Economics
44 (1999), 81—103.
Shi, Shouyong, “Liquidity, Bargaining, and Multiple Equilibria in a Search Monetary Model,”
Annals of Economics and Finance 2 (2001), 191—217.
Starr, Ross, “The Structure of Exchange in Barter and Monetary Economies,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics 86 (1972), 290—302.
Trejos, Alberto and Randall Wright, “Search, Bargaining, Money, and Prices,” Journal of Political
Economy 103 (1995), 118—141.
Williamson, Steven and Randall Wright, “Barter and Monetary Exchange under Private Infor-
mation,” American Economic Review 84 (1994), 104—123.
Zhou, Ruilin, “Individual and Aggregate Real Money Balances in a Random-Matching Model,”
International Economic Review 40 (1999), 1009—1038.
38
